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IT'S NOT LAW-THE WAR GUILT TRIALS
BY ORVILLE C. SNYDER*'
I
INTRODUCTION
Several times now the Supreme Court of the United States
has indicated that it has nothing to do with the new juris-
prudence' of the war-guilt trials. Throughout the stream of ap-
plications by the condemned from early in 1946 through 1948,
the Court persistently disclaimed jurisdiction in whole or in
part. There have been notable dissents but these do not alter
that record.
The first case, Yarnashita v Styer,2 was decided February 4,
1946. This case, coming up from an wholly American military
comnussion, was presented by motions for leave to file petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of prohibition, by petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of prohibition, and by a
petition for a writ of certiorari. All raised "substantially like
questions'"3 and all were denied. Mr. Chief Justice Stone in de-
livering the opinion of the Court said "For reasons already
stated we hold that the commission's rulings on evidence and on
the mode of conducting these proceedings against petitioner are
not reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing military
authorities. "4 In October 1946 decisions on the German cases 5
began. These cases were presented by motions for leave to file
petitions for writs of habeas corpus and were disposed of by the
* LL.B., Columbus College of Law; LL.M., Northwestern Univer-
sity; Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
'In the sense of a body of principles. "Jurisprudence. This term
has several meanings. It may mean chiefly the whole or some part
of the whole body of law. Thus Anglo-American Jurisprudence has
the same meaning a§ Anglo-American law. Sometimes it means the
course of decision of a particular court as when one speaks of the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States." KOcOUREK,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW (Boston, 1930), p. 55.
:327 U. S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 340.
'Id., 66 S. Ct. at 343.
'Id., 66 S. Ct. at 351.
';Ex Parte Betz, 329 U. S. 672, 67 S. Ct. 39 (Oct. 14, 1946), and
companion cases; see cases listed in footnote to Koki Hirota v. Mac-
Arthur, -U. S.-, 69 S. Ct. 157, 158 (Dec. 6, 1948)
L.J.-G
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Court, divided four to four. Mr. Justice Jackson did not par-
ticipate. Four members of the Court consistently took the posi-
tion that, under Article III, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion, there was no jurisdiction. Then the case of Kokz Hirota v
MacArthur6 and two other Japanese cases were presented by like
motions and, on December 6, 1948, Mr. Justice Jackson broke the
deadlock by voting for full hearing on the point of jurisdiction.
On December 20, 1948, 7 after full argument "on the question
of our power to grant the relief prayed," the Court, per curzanz,
held that "the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a
tribunal of the United States [but] the agent of the Allied
Powers. Under the foregoing circumstances the courts of the
United States have no power to review, to affirm, set aside or
annul the judgments and sentences. "s
INITIAL EFFECT OF DECISIONS
Thus the Court has declined to answer questions which
must be answered before it can be said whether the war-guilt
trials represent justice according to law, as law is understood in
our legal system, or justice according to something else. The
effect of these decisions is that the new jurisprudence has not
received, from that tribunal, which is symbolic to us of all that
law is, the accolade of juristic legitimacy
But, what is the law Or, more accurately, what is indispens-
ably necessary for a mode of inflicting pumshments to amount
to law9
II
REQUISITES OF LEGALITY
In our land, "law is simply a method of protecting free-
dom."9 Current expression of this identification of law with
liberty is found in President Truman's inaugural address, and
the principle goes far back to that beau systerze "first invented
in the woods.' 'o Whence it was taken by the Angles and Saxons
to England and there developed into those "fundamental rights
0 -U. S.-, 69 S. Ct. 157.
-U. S. -,69 S. Ct. 197.
'Id., at 198.
'KOCOUREK, supra n. 1, p. 251.
"MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Nugent Translation
New York, 1900), p. 195.
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of Englishmen"" on which, especially the historic expression
of their spirit in Magna Carta, the Coloists rested their case "to
a candid world.' '12 This identification of law with liberty is im-
manent in the Constitution. Commonly phrased in words of our
time, as follows "a government of laws and not of men," it was
known in Bracton's day in the form, Rex non debet sub hom nw
sed sub Deo et lege, the totality of which is, "there is no sover-
eign unless he conform to the principles of legality ,i3 All else
is tyranny "It is the law and the law only which can successfully
resist the encroachments of despotism.' ui4 "Where law ends,
tyranny begins."' 1 and "rebellion to tyrants is obedience to
God." 6 (A little eloquence is relished by the best of lawyers as
by the best of other men.)
Furthermore, as there is no sovereign without legality, there
is no legality without due process.' 7 A recent assertion of this
principle pops up also in President Truman's inaugural address,
where he speaks of the individual being subjected "to arrest
without lawful cause, puishment without trial.'is Webster's
classic exposition of what m meant by law is along the same line
"By law of the land is most clearly intended the general law, a
law, which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon in-
quiry and renders judgment only after trial."19 And the idea
had still more famous utterance in that 39th Chapter, to wit.
"No freeman shall be taken and imprisoned or disseized or exiled
'POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (Cam-
bridge, 1911), p. xxx; BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (Cooley, 4th ed. by Andrews, Chicago, 1899), Vol. I, p. 64,
Vol. IV, Chap. 33; DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (London, 1926),
Chap. IV; STEPHEN ON PLEADING (3rd Am. ed., Washington, 1882),
Introduction, p. 20; MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (Indianapolis, 1926),
p. 589; WALSH, HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (2nd ed., Indian-
apolis, 1932), p. 1, REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN COLONIES (Madison, 1899), Introduction, pp. 5-10; ZANE,
THE STORY OF LAW (New York, 1928), p. 114.
'-'See MOTT, supra n. 11, pp. 135, 136, 589.
"M MOTT, supra n. 11, p. 589.
U STEPHEN, supra n. 11, p. 19; see also p. 23.
'W Wm. Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Case of Wilkes, Jan. 9, 1770.
"An inscription on the cannon near which the ashes of Presi-
dent John Bradshaw were lodged, on the top of a high hill near
Martha Bay in Jamaica. Also found among papers of Thomas Jef-
ferson in his handwriting. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (10th
ed.), p. 1051.
" MOTT, supra n. 11, p. 589.
'New York World-Telegram, Jan. 20, 1949.
"See MOTT, supra n. 11, p. 202, n. 41.
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or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon
him except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the
land." This "version of natural right" 20 is the concept of law
embodied in the guaranties of all our constitutions. 21 But it is
much more venerable than that. It is inherent in the develop-
ment of law. "So great is the ascendency of the Law of Actions
in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at
first the look of being secreted in the interstices of procedure. '122
Nor is that pristine vigor spent in modern times, since "the
forms of action we have buried but they still rule us from their
graves." 23 The past and the present are instinct with the sense
of the maxim ubi jus ibN remedium which, far from being "a
mere tautological proposition," sums up the "inseparable con-
nection between the means of enforcing a right and the right to
be enforced. "
2 4
In such a legal system, little stress is wasted on divine-right
theories of law or perfect rules so sacred that redressing their
violation becomes a matter of "avenging Deity's cause. '2 5 Dis-
carded is the proposition that the end justifies the means.2 0 Law
in action is no mere cracking down before which all must be still
and know it is the law, with plenty of resulting bigotry
In contrast, our law breathes a spirit of greater humility
It pretends to no all-sufficient body of knowledge. It does not
assume that something beyond the "moral and intellectual
capacity" 27 of men does its work. But it harbors no philosophic
despair over the absence of an infallible prescience to guarantee
its judgments, nor over the fact that those judgments must, like
all the other works of men, stand the acid test of being known
2 HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (Cambridge,
1936), p. 122; cf. MOTT, supra n. 11, p. 252.
"See Bank of Columbia v Okely, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 234, 241, 244
(1819)
AITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (Cam-
bridge, 1936), p. 1, quoting MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM, p. 389.
See also HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Boston, 1938), pp. 253, 254.
MAITLAND, supra n. 22, p. 2.
DICEY, supra n. 11, p. 194; see also MAITLAND, supra n. 22, p. 6,
quoting Bracton, Tot erunt actiones quot sunt formulae brevum.
See MONTESQUIEU, supra n. 10, p. 227.
2Cf. The Epistle to the Romans, 2:7, 8: "For if the truth of God
hath more abounded through my life unto His glory; why yet am
I also 3udged as a sinner. And not rather (as we be slanderously re-
ported, and as some affirm we say) Let us do evil that good may
come? whose damnation is just."
I See for this phrase President Truman's inaugurfal address, New
York World-Telegram, Jan. 20, 1949.
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by their fruits.28 Mistakes do occur 29 but our courts have "from
the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correc-
tion. "30 Instead, right here, it is insisted in our system, is where
legality has its habitat-in painstaking care and repeated effort
to inquire fully and avoid error, through which alone can the
law preserve, protect, and defend the liberty and dignity of man
against the depredations of know-it-alls with the ready-made wis-
doni. This sense, as to the indispensable element which anything
claimed to be law must have, is written into the due-process
guaranties of all our constitutions, but is even more manifest in
provisions for clemency, in the jury's general verdict, in op-
portunity for review, in presumptions and burden of proof, and
most signally in everyday rules of evidence. 31 As we understand
law, the characteristic which makes any body of rules applying
to human conduct amount to law, is that it embodies the pro-
cesses of fair judgment.
32
But what are the requisites of due process of law 9
REQUISITES OF DUE PROCESS
Level of Inquriry
This is a task not to be approached in the spirit of a petti-
fogger with "his quiddities" and "quillets, his cases, his tenures,
and his tricks. "33 As Mr. Justice Jackson points out, "the issues
here are truly great ones,'' 34 and, as Mr. Justice Rutledge joins
in, "more is at stake than General Yamashita's fate,''35 for
involved are "the traditions of the common law and the Con-
stitution" 36 and the "long-held attachment which marks the
'-Cf. The Gospel according to St. Matthews, 7 16, 20: "Where-
fore by their fruits ye shall know them."
I Cf. GOGOL, DEAD SOULS (Modern Library), v 2, bk. 1, chap. 2,
p. 25.
'Frankfurter, J., in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct.
444, 452-3 (1940)
" Consider the use of confessions in our system with the pre-
occupation with confessions as the mystically perfect form of proof
in the system of the Soviets. Cf. MONTAIGNE, Of the Useful and the
Honest, ESSAYS (Modern Library), p. 688.
' Cf. The Gospel according to St. Matthews, 23:23: " for ye
pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the
weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith."
Hamlet, Act V, Sc. 1.
Koki Hirota v MacArthur, supra n. 6, at 159.
'Yamashita v. Styer, supra n. 2, at 360.
1 Id. at 366.
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great divide between our enemies and ourselves. '37  Conse-
quently, many things germane to due process and ordinarily im-
portant may be largely or entirely ignored. These trials, it was
hoped, would usher in "a new era of law ' 38 which all men could
understand. An effort will be made, therefore, to stick to the
plainest things.
There can, for instance, be little profit in cavilling that the
victors sat in judgment on the vanquished. If a "new era of
law" were to get started, that was the only way to do the job.
The vanquished could not very well have sat in judgment on the
victors and there are no neutrals any more who could have done
anything the victors did not want. Nor is there any sense in com-
plaiing that the Russians sat beside us. However false their
philosophy, 39 they are our allies. We vouched for them, if in no
other way, by getting them into the war with Japan, and the an-
nouncement of that feat brought nothing but gladsome cries from
the great heart of our people. (Of course, some may say they
were got in by selling China down the river and that the selling-
down was not announced when the word of their entry was given
out, but that seems rather to disqualify us and so we had best be
quiet about it.)
Hustling counsel is mentioned in the dissents in the
Yamashita case.40 Yet the defense performed "their difficult
assignment with extraordinary fidelity' '41-and enough suc-
cess to carry two Justices with them. Anyway, counsel fre-
quently is quite resolute in such situations, counsel exists for
that very purpose, among others, and more time is not neces-
sarily due process, it being simply wonderful what can be ac-
complished when one puts his mind to it. Plain folks probably
see tins sort of thing as lawyers' squabbling. Moreover, if there
was intimidation of witnesses or subornation, as in the Malmedy
massacre case, 42 that is an abuse, within our system as in all
systems, and not a denial of our system or the inauguration of
another system. Disputes over the technical constitution of a
court or commission, over interpretation of specific articles of
Id. at 360.Id. at 360.
See President Truman's inaugural address, New York World-
Telegram, Jan. 20, 1949.
"
0 Yamashita v Styer, supra n. 2, dissent, at 360.
"Id. at 361.
42 See Time, Jan. 17, 1949, p. 19.
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war or other provisions, or over conflicts between some of these,
again probably look like "quillets" or "quiddities" to most of
mankind, for whom, it was supposed, we were erecting standards.
Likewise, many differences of opiion on jurisdictional questions
seem more in the nature of dotting i's and crossing t's.
However, certain requisites of due process of law are plain
eiiough. We shall stick to these, namely,43 (1) an ascertainable
standard of conduct, (2) evidence, and (3) equality Since the
"conception of due process has always revolved around the idea
of criminal procedure" 44 and since the war-guilt trials involved
capital sanctions, these requisites are considered in their criminal
setting.
An Ascertaznable Standard of Conduct
The requisite of an ascertainable standard of conduct has
some relation to informing the accused of the charge in time for
him to make a defense. Thus, at the time of accusation and trial,
what it is claimed the accused has done must be set out with par-
ticularity and the law which his conduct violated must be
specific. "No man is punishable except for a distinct breach of
law.'' 4 But the requisite of an ascertainable standard of con-
duct goes further. The law denouncing an offense must
ante-date its commission, so that the accused could have obeyed
that law, had he wanted to do so.A6 The law must not be ex post
facto and this "principle of justice" is older than the prohibition
in the Constitution and the adoption of the Fifth Amendment.
It is a principle of the common law.47 Scholars have regarded
it as implicit in the idea of law. 48 Judgment according to -what
has previously been laid down "is of surpassing importance"
and the basis upon which "the whole elaborate structure of our
case-law has been built up.' '49 According to Blackstone, unless
the law penalizing a man for an act is notified in advance, "he
had therefore no cause to abstain from it, and all punishment for
3 See EvANs, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed.
by Throckmorton, Chicago, 1933), note, pp. 809-10.
"MOTT, supra n. 11, p. 83; see also p. 123.
" DICEY, supra n. 11, p. 244; see also p. 183.
"See Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions,
35 Ill. L. Rev. 121, 147 (1940), and authorities there cited.
'7Id. at 143 et seq. and authorities there cited.
"See KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS (Indianapolis, 1927), p. 3.
'1BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS (St. Paul, 1912), p. 183.
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not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust. "0 In
short, a "pre-existing rule of conduct'' 51 must have been set up
by "a regular enacted law. "
52
The pre-existing rule need not, however, be statutory
Though there are no common-law offenses against the United
States and some of the States any more, our legal system does
include an unwritten law of crimes. 3  In that law, precedents
supply the pre-existing rule and requisite certainty
But in a case-law system, where there is no precedent, de-
cision may be made "on principle." '54 That is how "original
precedents" come about.5 5 Moreover, in our "doctrine of pre-
cedents," that companion element of stare decisis, the declara-
tory theory, is to the effect that "cases do not make law, but are
only the best evidence of what the law is.'' In overruling a
precedent, for instance, it is said there is merely a return to pre-
existing principle. And the common law of crimes, includinx
as it does ideas expressed by the phrases contra bonos mores57
and malun n se,58 provides shoals and shoals of general prin-
ciples of right and wrong, supposedly known naturally to every-
body- If criminal prosecutions can be grounded on these general
moral principles, the requisite of pre-existing rule and distinct
breach is a myth. Retroactivity lies at the very heart of our law.
Nothing like an ascertainable definition of the way in which
something morally wrong must be committed for that form of
conduct to amount to a legal offense, is required at all. It has,
in modern times, even been argued that, since in any case "the
judge's decision is in every sense of the word ex post
I BL. COMM., I., 45. Cf. MONTAIGNE, ESSAYS (translation by E. J.
Trechman, London, 1935), Cowardice is the Mother of Cruelty, p.
141. "The killing after victory is usually done by the rabble and the
baggage-officials."
" HAINES, supra n. 20, p. 115.
12 HAINES, supra n. 20, p. 122; International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 34 S. Ct. 853 (1913), United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298 (1920), Cummings v.
Missouri, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (1867), test-oath cases, listed in MOTT,
supra n. I1, p. 312, n. 35.
"See MILLER ON CRIMINAL LAW (St. Paul, 1934), pp. 27-32;
SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (Rochester, 1930), pp. 57-63.
BLACK, supra n. 49, p. 159.
Ibid.
"See Snyder, supra n. 46,-p. 122, and authorities there cited.
7See WAITE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (Chicago,
1931), pp. 23-36.
rSee MILLER, supra n. 53, p. 23.
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facto,"'" retroactivity and uncertainty are objectively un-
avoidable." 60 This classifies more as bon mot than as serious
assertion that in law, since different measurers may get varying
totals, no yardstick nor table of measures is provided in advance
or, if they are, they do not mean anything. But along with the
other foregoing considerations, it does help to make one wonder
where the pre-existing rule of enacted law would be in any case
where no "original precedent" had been laid down. But that is
only an ostensible difficulty and there is no use in getting
"balmy" about it. We do not have to go back to the days of wer
and wile and bot and start speculating around. Throughout all
the days of our years, there have been plenty of definitive pre-
cedents'l and it would be odd indeed to find, since the Constitu-
tional Fathers wrote their immortal document, a prosecution for
any act not previously defined by the processes of judicial in-
elusion and exclusion or by a duly enacted statute.
The authorities do not leave us incontinently up in the air.
Who supposes that a criminal prosecution could be maintained
under the moral law, "thou shalt not kill",? Exodus62 and
Deuteronomy63 are full of specifications of that general prin-
ciple. i'umbers0 4 contains elaborate details on murder. Some
killings are lawful and some unlawful. Those unlawful are not
all visited with identical denunciation. In the same revelations
out of which the Decalogue's "thou shalt not kill" came, war of
conquest ii Canaan was enjoined.65 These detailed definitions,
the differentiations in degree, and the discrimination between
lawful and unlawful killings, etc. are no less necessary to our
law. Anti-retroactivity is there and its elements are defined
within practicable limits.
While the pre-existing rule need not be so precise as a com-
mon-law indictment 6 6 or so explicit as to exclude all possibility of
difference in judgment between the accused and a jury, 7 there
"FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (New York, 1930), p. 116;
see also pp. 34, 173, and 224.
Id. at 329.
See Snyder, supra n. 46, p. 125.
"Chaps. 20, 21, 33, 34.
Chap. 21, et seq.
Chap. 35:16-29.
Deuteronomy 7" 16.
Yamashita v Styer, supra n. 2, at 349.
6'Nash v United States, 229 U.S. 373, 33 S. Ct. 780, 781 (1912)
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must be a "standard of conduct that it is possible to know. ' 6"
Matters cannot be left to what is deemed "unjust and unreason-
able in the estimation of court and jury "69 "While the criterion
m such cases is to examine whether common social duty would,
under the circumstances, have suggested more circumspect con-
duct," 70 some "specific and definite act"71 must be denounced.
Ev zdence
The requisite of full proof, usually subsumed under the
rubric of notice and hearing, is embodied in several provisions
of all our constitutions, such as, those against bills of attainder
and those for jury trial, counsel, and compulsory process to ob-
tain evidence. Beyond any and all of these, however, this re-
quirement is rooted in that basic due process of law which ante-
dates the Constitution. It is another principle of justice "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked fundamental.'"72 Courts of justice cannot proceed arbi-
trarily but only on inquiry and evidence.
73
Evidence and its concomitant burden of proof are the gist of
notice and hearing. Why 9 While getting the facts, a fair trial,
and so forth, are usually thought of as measures for the protec-
tion of the accused, they are not required just to promote a spirit
of sportmanship. If it were merely desired to give the accused
a break, that could be as well accomplished by guaranteeing him
a doughty champion or allowing his champion a longer sword.
Why the insistence on dull evidence 9 What is it for? For it is
silly, as every layman knows, to take evidence if the truth is no
better known after than before. The law insists on no such vain
thing nor does it exist to give lawyers jobs, whatever so-called
wits may sicker.
" 'Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by
which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted
I International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra n. 52, at 855.
11 United States v Cohen Grocery Co., supra n. 52, at 300.
7Nash v. United States, supra n. 67, at 781.
7United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., supra n. 52, at 299.
12Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332
(1934).
13Twnng v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908). See
MOTT, supra n..11, Chap. XIII; and authorities cited m HALL, CASES
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (St. Paul, 1913), notes pp. 283, 285, 286.
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to investigation, is established or disproved.' ,,74 That's it. The
matters are only "alleged." We want to get at the truth of
them. That is the real purpose of notice and hearing, the func-
tion of evidence, and the reason the accussed is permitted to ap-
pear and defend, to have counsel and compulsory process.
Exclusionary rules, which are so characteristic of our law of
evidence, 75 are themselves but devices to aid 76 the search for
truth by keeping out matters which only confuse or mislead. We
want to bring out the whole story Our trials are not supposed
to be sporting events nor mystic ordeals but sane inquiries into
the truth of matters alleged.
Equality
Concerning the requisite of equality, little needs saying here.
This is anti-discrimination about which so much has been said of
late and about which the war seems to have been fought. The
requirement is that no person shall be denied due process of law.
The accent is on the no and that means everybody gets the same
dose-good and bad, white and black, and in-between. 77
Usually referred to the guaranty of "equal protection of the
laws" this requisite is equally an integral part of basic due
process of law7 8 and really implicit in full proof with its in-
separable burden of proof and presumption of innocence.
III
THE TRIALS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
YAMASHITA
The Ascertainable Standard of Conduct
"The charge, so far as now relevant, is that petitioner, be-
tween October 9, 1944 and September 2, 1945, in the Philippine
Islands, 'while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with
the United States of America and its allies, unlawfully disre-
"RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (7th ed. by Jerome Prince, Brooklyn,
(1948), p. 1, quoting GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, 16th ed., sec. 1.
ITHAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (Boston, 1898),
p. 264.
'a WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF (2nd ed., Boston,
1931), Chap. 1.
"Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
'MOTT, supra n. 11, p. 276 and passim Chap. XV, and authorities
there cited.
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garded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to con-
trol operations of the members of his command, permitting them
to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people
of the United States and of its allies and dependencies, par-
ticularly the Philippines, and he thereby violated the laws
of war.' Bills of particulars, filed by the prosecution allege
a series of acts, one hundred and twenty-three in number, com-
mitted by members of the forces under petitioner's command,
during the period mentioned."79
Of this charge, the Court says "Obviously charges of viola-
tions of the law of war triable before a military tribunal need not
be stated with the precision of a common law indictment we
conclude that the allegations of the charge, tested by any reason-
able standard, adequately allege a violation of the law of war."s1
The Court finds that an ascertainable standard of conduct
had previously been established as early as 1907 in the Fourth
Hague Convention and 1929 at the Geneva Red Cross Conven-
tion;si that in 1942 "the President proclaimed that enemy
beligerents who, during time of war, enter the United States, or
any territory in possession thereof, and who violate the law of
war, should be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction
of military tribunals,"82 that paragraph 10 of the Declaration
of Potsdam of July 6, 1945, declared that ' stern justice shall
be meted out to all war criminals including those who have
visited cruelties upon prisoners,' and that "this Declaration
was accepted by the Japanese government by its note of August
10, 1945. ' '83
Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting, says that all this is "a cloak
of false legalism" and continues "Nothing in all history or in
international law justifies such a charge against a fallen
commander of a defeated force. To use the very inefficiency and
disorganization created by the victorious forces as the primary
basis for condemning officers of the defeated armies bears no
resemblance to justice or to military reality International law
makes no attempt to define the duties of a commander of an army
under constant and overwhelming assault. Even the laws of
-1 Yamashita v Styer, supra n. 2, at 347.
'OId. at 349.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 345.
SId. at 345.
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war heretofore recognized by this nation fail to impute responsi-
bility to a fallen commander for excesses committed by his dis-
organized troops while under attack. In no recorded instance
has the mere inability to control troops under fire or attack
by superior forces been made the basis of a charge violating the
laws of war. The only conclusion I can draw is that the
charge made against the petitioner is clearly without precedent
in international law or in the annals of recorded military
history "s-4
Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, says "This trial is
unprecedented in our history Never before have we tried and
convicted an enemy general for action taken during hostilities or
otherwise in the course of military operations. Much less have
we condemned one for failing to take action. The novelty is
legal as well as historical. We are on strange ground. It is
not in our tradition for anyone to be charged with crime which is
defined after his conduct, alleged to be criminal, has taken place,
or in language not sufficient to inform him of the nature of the
offense or to enable him to make defense. My Brother
MUIRPHY has discussed the charge with respect to the substance
of the crime. With his conclusions in this respect I agree. '" 8
The over-all impression from these opinions induces, with
some slight hesitancy, the belief that the charge was specific en-
ough and was based on documents sufficiently definitive and in
existence before the offense was committed. The principal dif-
ficulty arises from the fact that we do have a doctrine of judicial
supremacy and from the position the Supreme Court had taken
in the time of John Marshall that "the laws of no nation can
justly extend beyond its own territories except so far as regards
its own citizens."sO and had adhered to nearly a century later,
as follows "Law is a statement of circumstances in which the
public force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts.
But the word commonly is confined to such prophecies or threats
when addressed to persons living within the power of the courts.
Words having universal scope will be taken, as a matter
of course to mean only everyone subject to such legislation, not
'Id. at 354-59.
MId. at 360-62.
The Apollon, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 362, 370 (1824).
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all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch.' '87 Since
"the criterion is whether common social duty would,
under the circumstances, have suggested more circumspect con-
duct," 88 it is pretty farfetched to assert that anybody could have
foreseen, let alone did apprehend, that the contents of these docu-
ments were applicable, in the way they were applied, to the con-
duct of the commander of a foreign army While the Court does
not say, as it does concerning the evidence, that the charge was
not tested by the standards of due process of law, the opinion
leaves no impression that it was.
The Evidence
The opinion of the Court says "We do not appraise the
evidence on which petitioner was convicted.89  which was
enough to require the commission to hear evidence tending to
establish the culpable failure of petitioner to perform the duty
imposed on him by the law of war and to pass upon its suf-
ficiency to establish guilt."9 0
Mr. Justice Murphy says "Had there been some element of
knowledge or direct connection with the atrocities the problem
would be entirely different. Instead the loose charge was
made that great numbers of atrocities had been committed and
that petitioner was the commanding officer; hence he must have
been guilty of disregard of duty "9'
Mr. Justice Rutledge says "Every conceivable land of state-
ment, rumor, report, at first, second, third or further hand, writ-
ten, printed, or oral, and one 'propaganda film' were allowed
to come in, most of this relating to atrocities committed by troops
under petitioner's command throughout the several thousand is-
lands of the Philippine Archipelago during the period of active
hostilities covered by the American forces' return to and re-
capture of the Philippines. But there is not a suggestion in
the findings that petitioner personally participated in, was pres-
ent at the occurence of, or ordered any of these incidents, with
the exception of the wholly inferential suggestion noted below.
This vagueness, if not vacuity, in the findings runs through-
' American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29
S. Ct. 511, 512-13.
'Nash v United States, supra n. 67, at 781.
Yamashita v Styer, supra n. 2, at 348.
oId. at 349.
'Id. at 359.
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out the proceedings from the charge itself through the proof and
findings, to the conclusion. And m that state of things
petitioner has been convicted of a crime in which knowledge is an
essential element, with no proof of knowledge other than what
would be inadmissible in any other capital case or proceeding
under our system, civil or military, Petitioner asserts, and
there can be no reason to doubt, that by the use of all this for-
bidden evidence he was deprived of the right of cross-examination
and other means to establish the credibility of the deponents or
affiants, not to speak of the authors of reports, letters, docu-
ments, and newspaper articles. Further comment is hardly
required. "92
.Mr. Justice Rutledge concludes "The Court does not
declare expressly that petitioner as an enemy belligerent has no
constitutional rights, a ruling I could understand but not accept.
Neither does it affirm that he has some, if but little, constitu-
tional protection. Nor does the Court defend what was done.
All this the Court puts to one side with the short assertion
that no question of due process under the Fifth Amendment or
jurisdiction reniewable here is presented.' 93  Mr. J'ustice
Murphy says that "petitioners's rights under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment were grossly and openly violated
without any justification. "94
The Court further says that the conviction was not "without
the support of evidence. ' 9" "The conduct of the trial by the
military commission has been authorized by the political branch
of the Government, by military command, by international law
and usage, and by the terms of the surrender of the Japanese
government. '"96 "We cannot say that the commission, in ad-
mitting evidence to which objection is now made, violated any
act of Congress, treaty, or military command defining the com-
mission's authority For reasons already stated we hold that the
commission's rulings on evidence and on the mode of conducting
these proceedings against petitioner are not reviewable by the
courts, but only by the reviewing military authorities. From
this viewpoint it is unnecessary to consider what, in other situa-
"Id. at 363-68.
' Id. at 377-78.
"Id. at 359.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347.
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tions, the Fifth Amendment might require, and as to that no in-
timation one way or the other is to be implied.'"'7
All opinions agree that the evidence was not weighed in the
scales of due process of law. The Court says that there was
evidence but does not say whether that evidence, if tested by the
standards of due process, would have been deficient to a degree
requiring annulment of the conviction, or enough to justify its
affirmance. Had the Court believed the evidence sufficient by
the standards of due process of law, it is strange that it did not
say so in support of its decision, instead of painstakingly remov-
ing the Fifth Amendment out of the picture and carefully point-
ing up the political authorization of the proceedings.
The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that the causal
connection between Yamashita's acts and/or omissions was not
established by evidence of the value which due process requires.
Equality
It is enough to call attention to the trial of Communist
leaders now in progress in New York. This aspect need not be
labored, since it would have little significance had there been
full proof.
ToJO AND GOERING
These two names are convenient symbols, although neither
appears in any case, of the two main trials of the war-lords,
which are those in which everybody is interested. The German
cases98 and the Hirota case indicate plainly the Court's position
in regard to these two trials. Since we have no judicial record
here, as in the Yam ashita case, all decisions announcing only dis-
claimer of jurisdiction, recourse is had to public prints, but suf-
ficient salient facts there recorded seem to be beyond dispute.
The Ascertainable Standard of Conidict
"The theory of Nuremberg was that the evil deeds consisted
of initiation of war and of atrocities in its conduct."09 That is
the substance of the charges against the Japanese war-lords also.
These charges go beyond anything presented against
Yamashita. They embrace "analysis and refinement of the prm-
RId. at 351.
'These cases effectively cover what would have happened to an
application by any of the war-lords.
FORTUNE, April 1947, p. 29, statement by technical adviser to
U.S. judge at Nuremberg.
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ciples of liability, in terms of the deep issues involved in the
application of international sanctions to individuals, subject as
they are to the demands and the compulsions of the state in
which they live. The search was for rules of responsibility that
we would be prepared to apply to ourselves. "1°°0
The standard of conduct ante-dating the offenses was found
in such documents as those of Hague Conventions and the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact.1"" There is little doubt that, at the time of
accusation and trial, the charges were specific enough and
standards of conduct had been spelled out.
Difficulty arises again from the fact that we do have a
doctrine of judicial supremacy and from the position the
Supreme Court had taken as to how far the law's prophecies and
threats, of application of public force, extend. These trials were
"firsts." There was little ground for believing, before Stalin's
toast at Teheran112 that the contents of these documents were
applicable in the way they were applied, or after that toast that
they would be applied in the way they were applied. It is true
that the trials transcend "an ordinary tort or criminal action"
and confront us with "the question history will pose," that to
the minds of plain folks there is no reason why, if the little fel-
lows may hang, the big fellows should get off, and that ignorance
of the law is no defense. It also is true that, for a long time, we
have had the concept of due process of law, and have known that
want of a pre-existing rule, suggesting under the circumstances
more circumspect conduct, is repugnant to that concept.
"Original precedents" hardly in truth supply the need. 1 3 Men
are free from being condemned except for violation of the law
they could have known and obeyed.
The Ewidence
The evidence consisted largely of captured enemy docu-
ments.i '1 4 There was a lot of them and there is no question as to
their admissibility
Id. at 30.
"" Ibid., FORTUNE, December 1945, February 1946; LiFE, Septem-
ber 16, 1946, October 14, 1946. It is believed there was no essential
difference m the Japanese cases.
'"'FORTUNE, December 1946.
""See supra n. 61.
"'See supra n. 101. It is believed there was no essential differ-
ence in the Japanese cases.
L.J.-7
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
However, "this was not only a problem of weighing and
evaluating evidence" in any ordinary setting. It involved
"analysis and refinement of the principles of liability "1"5
In our legal system, the first principle of liability is causal
connection between the harm done and the conduct of the de-
fendant. Nobody is any the less guilty because he did not act
alone, nor because others, who had or may have had as much as
or more than he to do with bringing about the harm done, are
not at bar with him, may never be at any bar of justice, or per-
haps even sit in judgment on him. Still it is necessary to know
what the accused himself atually did. The time-tested way of
finding this out is to establish what did happen and then to coil-
nect the accused, in some measure, causally with that.
Moreover, in these trials we were not engaged merely in
hanging the defendants. We were making "aii irrevocable
moral commitment.' ' 1i6 Putting the defendants on trial was the
means of putting war-making on trial. We wanted to prevent
war. To do that we needed to find out how wars are caused so
that, knowing how one war had been brought about, we could put
our foot down hard at the right place to prevent another. "The
search was for rules of responsibility that we would be prepared
to apply to ourselves.' 1107 That requires knowledge.
What happened was the war. With that the defendants
were connected, but first it had to be known how the war
actually got started. For, as in the great venture of making
peace and building a just world "no nation can succeed alone,"
this war did not get started by any single-handed effort. Only
weeks before the guns began to shoot in Europe, there was a pact
at Moscow. In the same year as Pearl Harbor, there was another
pact at Moscow, offerred to the surprised Matsuoka, of which it
was then said " it is Japan which has been freed. What
has taken place is the removal of the threat to the Japanese
flank in Manchukuo. ' 108 At the trials, the Berlin and Tokyo
secret files were open. The evidence would have shown more
fully and convincingly how the war did in fact get started, had
the Moscow files been there too. This is not idle quibbling that
Supra n. 99, at 30.
' Id. at 32.
' Id. at 30.
NEWSWEEK, April 21, 1941, p. 28; NEWSWEEK, March 10, 1941,
TIME, July 7, 1941.
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compulsory process should have been granted for the examination
of Winston Churchill, nor is it doing an ostrich-act in face of the
fact the tribunals would have dismally failed had they requested
the production of the secrets of the Kremlin. Mlerely, the
evidence was incomplete. It did not show how the war actually
was prepared or touched off, nor exactly what hand the defend-
ants had in that series of events.
This evidence provides the basis on which defendants were
hanged but it is not the whole story Due process of law re-
quires, at least aims at, the whole story
Eqzuality
There is no occasion for comment further than that made
above on Yamashita.
CONCLUSION
Now, does all this mean anything The dissenting Justices
assailed the convictions but the Court did not upset them. Does
not that make them lawful? In fact, the Court in the Yamashita
case says "We conclude that the detention of petitioner for
trial and his detention upon his conviction, subject to the pre-
scribed review by the military authorities, were lawful.'109
Does that not settle it"
There are, however, different kinds of law and different
ways of being lawful. There is the law of the jungle, which is
different from the law of due process. Those who object that
this is mere rhetoric would catch on right handily were it as-
serted that, when a President gets the mails into a strike-bound
city by military escort, he is acting lawfully Nobody could fail
to perceive that his act might not be lawful by the standards of
due process of law, and yet the courts might be unable to do any-
thing about it. Yamashita's conviction too, can be lawful in the
sense that it took place through the power of the political branch
and the Courts had no power to set it aside, but that does not
prove it embodied due process of law
Alongside the plainest requisites, these trials do not look
like due process and no decision of the Court lends any support
to calling them "legal" in the due-process sense. In the Yana-
sita case, the Court held the proceedings need not measure up
"' Yamashita v. Styer, supra n. 2, at 353.
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to the standards of due process, and the opinion goes far towards
characterizing that trial as political.
Hence, it is concluded that the war-guilt trials do not
represent due process of law. In that sense they are not law.
This conclusion accords with fundamental instincts and
sentiments of the American people.
The ordinary American, layman and lawyer too, is m reality
little shocked by the expression, "Give him a fair trial and shoot
him." He knows that often the guilt of the accused is as certain
and well known before trial as after, but he figures that a fair
trial is needed, because doing it that way makes everything open
and above-board, shows the world how right we are, and guards
against mistakes, which do sometimes occur. He regards "Shoot
him first and try him afterwards" as but a bad joke, and he is
mighty skeptical about "Why waste time? Shoot him and get
it over with." Although he himself occasionally does just that,
he is positive it is quite bad practice.
The war-guilt trials were bottomed on and calculated to
elicit the support of these common and habitual feelings of the
American people. The reason trials were had is that nobody
dared to affront them.
But the gorge of an American rises at what he calls "rail-
roading." By "railroading" he means "slipping up" on
somebody, "faking" evidence against him, not "letting him tell
his story," not getting or not trying to get "the whole story
Uninterested in the right of defense as an opportunity for
lawyers' monkeyshines, he despises "technicalities." He pays
little attention to what he suspects is legal .mumbo-jumbo about
the sacredness of the right of defense, and is undisturbed by ap-
prehension that "it could happen to him." But he wants to
find out what went on and to know what he is doing, and he has
a feeling that about the only way the whole story will come out
is to let almost everything, including the "kitchen sink," come
in, as long as nobody gets nasty about it. And he hates anybody
who tries to prevent "everything from coming out in the wash,"
or who insists that it has when it has not. This sort of thing is
sure to arouse his most combative sense of fair play, self-esteem,
and curiosity
These are the reasons why the ordinary American stands
up for a fair trial for notorious and evil persons and even for
the known guilty, whose acquittal after a fair trial might make
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him "hopping mad." It is to get full disclosure that he tolerates
widespread abuse of the right of defense.
The sadness of the war-guilt trials lies in the fact that we
were less sure afterwards than before, less clear as to what the
defendants had done and how they had done it, and not certain
of what exactly they had been convicted. They were just guilty
Performance had fallen short of billing and we had not been
put before the world to very good advantage. That is
deplorable.
IV
WHY MAINTAIN THE DISTINCTIONS?
This conclusion will not be universally satisfactory Before
the Court took its position, the assertion had been made that
these trials are "obviously politics and not law,"iio and this
proposition has, at least by inference, been denied. Running
through one form of this denial is a strong suggestion that the
trials be called "legally just,"1' with no attempt to demonstrate
that they do embody the requisites of due process of law. Rather
there seems a passion of indifference to the fact that they do
not, and this deficiency makes the argument sound a little
amoral.
However, now that the trials are past, most of the defend-
ants have been convicted and some hanged, all of which is
permanent, does there remain any reason, other than that the
trials do not represent due process, why the distinctions between
politics and legality should be maintained ? There are several
1. As indicated above, the word "lawful" has different
meanings in varying contexts. So the word "justice" does not
always have identical connotations. While justice means
"merited reward or punishment,' 'ii2 "it is essential to a clear
understanding of this matter to remember that the administra-
tion of justice is perfectly possible without law at all. '"1 1 3 For
instance, there is poetic justice, a most satisfying thing.14 And
"revenge," says Francis Bacon, "is a kind of wild justice." He
""John Haynes Holmes in FORTUNE, February 1946, p. 12.
" Supra n. 99.
m Webster.
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (8th ed., London,, 1930), p. 40.
Of Revenge, ESSAYS, (Modern Student's Library, New York,
1908), p. 19.
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adds, "which the more man's nature turns to, the more ought law
to weed it out," but that does not take away its being "a kind of
justice." Much organized force against individuals is often
deemed just in a sort of way However, justice can be done
in other ways. It can be administered also according to due
process of law.
Thus it appears that justice is an end to be served but more
means than one exist whereby to do justice. Although justice
always is constructive in some kind of way and reason invariably
concludes that its punishments are deserved, the means by which
justice is done differ. Moreover, some are bad. The fact that
justice has been done does not necessarily mean that the method
of its accomplishment is good. This distinction is rendered very
plain by recalling that "lynch law often gets the right
man.'"'ii The ends of justice are important. In our legal
system it so happens that the method of adimnistering justice
also is of surpassing importance. That is what our priceless
heritage means.
Keeping these distinctions clear, with regard to the war-
guilt trials, entails no obloquy of "standing up for those
monsters" and involves no failure to perceive the fact that calling
the trials "politics" does not obviate the necessity of evaluating
them in terms of justice. 11 Keeping these distinctions clear is
actually perceiving and facing the fact that the trials must be
evaluated in terms of justice and that doing this requires evaluat-
ing them in the terms of the ends they served. This job is not
done, but avoided, by characterizing inaccurately, or mis-label-
ling, the means to those ends-which is what calling the trials
" LirE, May 28, 1945.
' Cf. supra n. 99, p. 29. It would be interesting to hear the trials
defended on the ground they are preventing war and abolishing
atrocities. The next war-and that is the only one worth preventing
-will have headquarters in Washington and Moscow. Conceded that
men contemplating war or plotting treason take into consideration,
to some extent, the contingency of failure and that to them the
sanctions are addressed (see FORTUNE, April 1947, p. 30), it is hard
to detect anybody, in the midst of these powers or their allies or
satellites, who may-be contemplating war, plotting treason, or com-
mitting atrocities, who also is notably deterred by the prospect of the
hangman's noose. Anyway, there was not much concern about some
atrocities, certainly not much about those in Siberia or Spain, only
about other atrocities and perhaps about forcing the surrender of
Singapore. There does seem to be a case bottomed on retribution for
those -events rather than on the preventive aspect of the trials. One
wonders why it is not made.
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"legally just" does, since that almost certainly pins the due-
process label on them. This characterization not only is mac-
curate, it also obscures, if it does not render impossible, any
genuine evaluation of the trials in the terms of the ends they
iserved and, moreover, befogs and disorders the concept of due
protess of law The need of doing the former and the necessity
of avoiding the latter present the real issues with respect to these
trials.
2. We need to be believed. If the great moral commitment
is not to go for nought, we must be believed. Mr. Justice Jackson
once said "If you are determined to execute a man in any case,
there is no occasion for a trial, the world yields no respect for
courts that are merely organized to convict.'' 117 Since all along
nobody had any doubt as to what was going to happen to
Yamashita, Goering, and Tojo, 11s the trials had no function ex-
cept that of exhibiting to the world the superiority of our methods
of admimstering justice and of convincing the world that we
meant what we said. Now, calling the trials which occurred
true exhibits of due process of law can only forfeit remaining
faith that this venture can bear sound fruit. The hope, re-
portedly expressed by Attorney-General Clark, that the trials
would deal out what in Texas is called "law west of the Pecos"i19
has the merit of calling it by its right name.
3. Making distinctions is lawyers' business. It is the task
and honor of our profession. The Court did not accord these
trials the due-process label. We can profit from that example.
4. The practice of throwing in almost everything and
covering it up with a good or bad name does not work any too
well for us. Something like that was done on "freedom of con-
tract," of which "bravely re-affirmed on June 1, 1936, a large
section was overruled March 29, 1937-a denou6ment less
than glorious. "'20
The unitary dialectic is better left to the exponents of that
"false philosophy based on the belief that man is so weak
and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself."i 2 1 They
"'Supra n. 115.
" FORTUNE, December 1945.
Ibid.
') Snyder, Freedom of the Press-Personal Liberty or Property
Liberty? 20 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 3 (1940)
11lPresident Truman's Inaugural Address, New York World-
Telegram, Jan. 20, 1949.
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have undoubted gemus for the garbage-can technique. If we
play them at their own game, we are going to get licked.
V
FURTHER EFFECTS OF THE DECISIONS
First of all, the decisions of the war-guilt trials re-emphasize
the need of defining our terms.
In the second place, they remind us that there is a large
area in which justice does operate through political action. The
fact of such an area is not news. Its existence has been kno-n
for a long time. However, as Professor Patterson's recent
book 122 makes clear, we have been getting more and more
Presidential Government. These decisions are additional markers
on the way
Aside from placing the war-guilt trials in this area, the
decisions leave its boundaries and extent, by careful negation of
implications in the Yamashita case, to future developments.
There does seem some basis though for a surmise that the prin-
ciples of Ex Parte Mfilligan, 123 as hitherto taken for granted,
may be abated to some extent. To what extent no one can
anticipate.
Recognition that the trials do not represent due process of
law carries with it no license for disclaiming responsibility for
them. That would be unworthy of a great people. At least
some of our principal enemies did not disavow their acts. 12 4 We
cannot do less.
Meanwhile, these developments furnish subject matter for
our courses in Constitutional Law. Since we have justice by
political action and justice according to due process of law,
lawyers will need to know something-more than judicial process
and beyond Marbury v Madison-about both, at a minimum
enough to discriminate between them. And, while the new or
quasi-jurisprudence of these trials is here, it is to be remem-
bered that it is not law. This tub, like any other, must stand on
its own bottom.
SPRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Chapel
Hill, 1947)
'4 Wall. (U.S.) 2 (1866).
'LIFE, April 1, 1946; TIME, March 25, 1946.
